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“A project is a problem scheduled to be solved.” (J. M. Juran)  
Definition, Complexity and Optimisation of Projects 
A project is a one-time process. Project leaders 
manage to cope with the unique character of 
each project by applying standard methods and 
by optimising the four steps from definition to 
planning, execution and completion. 
1. A brief Definition of a Project  
A project is by (a most simple) definition: 
• unique – it therefore bears the risk of failure; 
• targeted to change a system of any kind; 
• limited in time and costs; 
• related to a costumer. 
Projectum (lat.) means thrown forward, just like 
defining a goal to be reached in the future. 
2. Four major processing Steps (Phases) 
Processus (lat.) means to go forward - like 
performing steps towards a goal. Thus, a project is 
a one-time-process. The generic process of 
projects consists of four consecutive steps 
(following [1]): 
1) The order defines scope, duration and deadlines, 
costs, resources (human or machine) and 
organisation (how to take decisions a.o.) 
2) Planning (≠ design) defines the schedule and 
therefore the allocation of costs and resources over 
time. It may also anticipate the communication 
about the project to stakeholders a.o. 
3) Execution means actually carrying out the work 
(examination, design (≠ planning), construction a.o.) 
and controlling (steering!) of this work. It is usually 
the longest phase. 
4) Completion stands for an actual statement to 
have reached the goal(s) and for closure of the 
work. Its documentation is an input for the feedback 
loop of optimising standard procedures (methods).  
3. Project Management and fractal Geometry 
Project management can be looked at as a 
separate process, executed in parallel during all four 
major processing steps and taking care of all 
substeps and tasks of any size during the project 
(fractal view).  
Project management in general means: defining 
tasks (1), assigning resources (money, time and 
working force (2)), controlling (steering! (3)) and 
acceptance of results (4). This approach is universal 
with regard to any kind of environment and project 
objective as well as the stage or phase (step) of any 
project. Every step can be viewed as a project 
within the project resembling a fractal geometry. 
The result of each “project” within the project would 
then be: 
• definition -> signed order or contract; 
• planning -> granted schedule and means; 
• execution -> actual system or result; 
• completion -> acceptance of results /   
release of resources. 
In addition, every step will need an (internal) order 
some planning of the step itself (scheduling), the 
actual execution and the completion of the step. 
The decision making about completion of every step 
and releasing the next step or substep is known as 
milestones: pass, repeat or abort. This is subject to 
the (individual) organisation of the project. 
4. Project or Process? Private or Business? 
Projects and business processes can be viewed as 
operations to meet business needs with identical 
characteristics. Fig. 1 implies that goals and tasks 
of projects are followed outside the standard 
organisation a.o., e.g.  from contractors or bringing 
together employees from different units of a 
company (following [1] and [2]). 
Characteristic project process 
order / mission statement * a X y 9 QQQQ 
results (targeted) a X y 9 QQQQ 
budget a X y 9 QQQQ 
beginning and end  a X y 9 QQQQ 
planning and schedule a X y 9 QQQQ 
deadlines a X y 9 QQQQ 
responsibility / decisions a X y 9 QQQQ 
team and organisation a X y 9 QQQQ 
management tools QQQQ QQQQ 
feedback loop (optimisation) QQQQ QQQQ  
* Costumer-related 
Fig. 1 Characteristics of projects and business 
processes: uniqueness vs. repetition. 
Some business processes may be executed 
repeatedly every year, e.g. planning of a school 
timetable, budgeting of an enterprise, appraisal 
interviews a.o. The major difference to projects is 
the number of repetitions and therefore the number 
of (possible) iterations for optimisation. 
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A hybrid form would (for example) be the work of a 
marketing division with its ordinary business 
process including yearly budget and planned 
number of campaign and some specific projects, 
partly executed by contractors (outside the 
standard organisation) with contract accordingly. 
Note: Some personal ”projects” or daily, private 
tasks may sometimes be challenging or even 
constantly optimised, but this is not sufficient to 
characterise them as ”project” or ”process” in the 
narrower sense of the word. But borders are fluent, 
of course. 
Note: While industrial farming undoubtedly is a 
business process, the growing of corn or wheat 
itself is a natural process, describable with biology, 
chemistry and physics. 
5. Project or System? Complexity and Risks! 
The risk of failure can be understood as a 
consequence of the complexity of a project. The 
smartspider (fig. 2) depicts the area covered by the 
indicators of complexity corresponding to the risk of 
failure. Some indicators for complexity are project-
driven (in the narrower sense of the word):  
• relevance to the costumer: from ”nice to have” 
to ”a question of life and death”; 
• importance of deadline(s): ”free” – ”monitored” 
– ”immovable / high pressure to quickly meet 
rigorous deadlines”; 
• number of participants to be coordinated:  
10 – 100 – 1’000 – 10’000 – 100’000; 
• availability and training in project methodology: 
tools and decision processes: 
”available” – developing” – ”not existing”.  
To compare the indicators, a scale is needed. This 
is the operationalisation (grey). 
Complexity may also be system-driven:  
• scale, visible as budget (and duration):  
10 k£  – 100 k£  – 1 M£  –  100 M£  – 1 B£;  
A long duration may mean changes to cope with 
both for external and internal reasons (at a 
potentially bad time): 
• costumers’ needs: additional / adapted 
scopes; 
• boundary conditions: modification of 
regulations, changes of decision makers, 
technical evolution, inflation a.o.  
• internal changes: new staff (loss of 
knowledge), modified policies due to 
reorganization, poor performance etc. 
• technical complexity (in a narrower sense): 
”simple” – ”many elements” – ”many links” – 
”many uncertainties” – ”complex”. 
• level of innovation: from ”routine” to  
”new for us” and ”pioneering act”. 
Project and system are related. The greater the 
complexity of the system, the more important the 
proper application of the project methodology will 
be. 
Opposition from parties concerned or interested 
can be a risk as well (stakeholder). The better they 
are organised and funded, the more effective their 
opposition will be. The more emotional an issue is, 
the easier it will be to incite people against 
something. Thus, the scale could reach from 
”neglectable” to ”of importance/to be monitored” to 
”dominant/threatening the projects’ success”. 
Disastrous Failure or heroic Success? 
 
Fig. 2 shows two examples and the 
whole range from distastrous failure 
to heroic success: 
• The Vasa – the biggest warship of 
its time – sank on her maiden 
voyage in 1628 – in light winds 
just one mile from the shore, 
killing some 50 people. It still is a 
didactic play at many anglophone 
universities.  
• Charles Lindbergh was the first 
man to cross the Atlantic from 
west to east on a solo-flight. His 
secret of success with his Spirit 
of St. Louis in sum: ”Reduce to 
the max!” 
The lessons learned from both 
examples still are relevant and 
instructive today. 
Fig. 2 Smartspider for complexity. 
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6. Lesson learned from the Vasa:  
Project Methodology matters 
The actual reason for the Vasa-disaster (from a 
systems point of view!) was a lack of stability due to 
the centre of gravity being too high above sea level. 
This can be explained with some bad design 
decisions and an inadequate armament with an 
increased number of heavy cannons on the second 
deck (compared to the original specifications). But 
the bad design must be seen as a result of both not 
mastering the systems complexity and inadequate 
project management:  
• The king frequently changed his ideas   
while the schedule pressure stayed high. 
But the change requests weren’t neither treated 
as such nor properly documented. This would 
have been the basis for complementary 
contracts and revised planning, meaning to pass 
through the steps ”definition” (1) and planning (2) 
of the generic process before actually applying 
the changes to the vasa (execution of work, step 
3: redesign and construction).  
Note the difference between an idea becoming 
reality without questioning and an idea as bases 
for a change request revealing the consequen-
ces and some conscious decisions about them. 
A decision at the end of each step would have 
been necessary to accept the results and to 
make the revised contract and planning the new 
bases for project controlling as the work goes 
on. 
It seems obvious, that it would have been 
necessary to stretch deadlines and rise the 
budget, particularly for requests that rise the 
level of innovation, because it takes time to 
reach the next level of innovation. One must be 
able to design, construct, test and customize 
these changes. 
In short: Project methodology (tools, decision 
processes) probably would have been available 
but they were poorly applied because of the 
hierarchical structure a.o. 
• The technical specifications and the   
documentation of changes were insufficient. 
• The level of innovation was (too) high, because 
shipbuilding was based on experience rather 
than calculations these days. Thus, 
modifications in the design should have been 
done in small increments. The level of innovation 
even was increased during the execution of work 
by aggravating key specifications. 
• Ignoring the obvious: A test conducted before 
launching clearly showed that the ship was not 
seaworthy. The test couldn’t even be carried out 
properly because of the glaring instability of 
Vasa’s hull. But the result of the test simply was 
ignored. 
The last point seems to be the most surprising and 
annoying lesson learned from the Vasa, while the 
importance of (in)adequate project management 
and its tools seems to be the most important one. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Smartspider of the Vasa-
disaster: 
- initial order and  
  methods at the time vs.  
- real-life execution vs.  
- additional cannons on the upper 
deck and other changes that 
affected the stability of the ship. 
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7. Lesson learned from the Spirit of St. Louis:  
”Reduce to the max” / ”small is beautiful” 
With regard to the smartspider, Charles Lindbergh 
tried to keep the area of project-risks small while his 
design decisions for the airplane aimed at a simple, 
reliable system optimised for the purpose of 
crossing the Atlantic Ocean just once. 
• To judge the relevance one may ask ”Who is the 
costumer” first? Orteig gave the idea, some 
people from St. Louis gave the money, but most 
importantly, Lindbergh commissioned himself to 
start defining and planning the project.  
Thus, the success or failure would have been of 
importance to him (”a question of life and 
death”), to his donors and – in the last place – to 
Orteig, the initiator of the award. 
Lindbergh’s success pushed the boundaries of 
aviation one step further. This can be seen as 
the benefit of the project. 
• Deadline(s) are contradictory: Lindbergh wanted 
to be quicker than anyone else, but there was 
no official or given deadline date of any kind. 
• Project organisation was kept to a minimum and 
efficient, as Lindbergh acted both as project 
manager and pilot. He also helped adapt the 
design of the airplane for the mission. All the 
relevant people were close together. Decision 
making becomes much easier that way. 
• Lindbergh seems to have had a clear view of 
how to proceed step by step: 1) financing, 2) 
reliable partners, 3) execution (design, 
construction, training and tests, actual flight).  
How much he planned into the future is 
unknown. He was probably unaware of the fact, 
that he would do shows in Europe, bring back 
his plane on a ship, do a lot of more shows in 
the States and finally leave the Spirit of St. Louis 
to a museum. 
With regard to the system it can be said that: 
• The scale of the system followed the maxim 
”design to cost”. It was therefore reasonably 
small (price of the plane plus costs for the 
modifications). The duration of the work can also 
be seen this way (phase 3 according to the 
generic process: design and construction). 
• The technical complexity (in a narrower sense) 
can be described as ”reduced to the max”. He 
chose a plane he basically already knew. 
• The level of innovation was kept deliberately low 
with regard to the used technical system: 
Modification of an existing design by omitting 
unnecessary parts and adding some other 
parts. It was outstanding with regard to the goal 
of solo crossing the Atlantic Ocean, of course. 
Opponents against the project are not known, just 
like in the case of Vasa. 
8. Optimisation of Projects 
To define the characteristics of an optimal system, 
the costs and benefits are put in relation to each 
other. This is both true for initial orders and change 
requests. There are four possible fields of change: 
• Optimisation in the proper meaning of the word 
is a higher ratio of benefits to costs. This should 
always be aimed at, of course. 
• Extension means both higher benefits and costs 
with the risk of a result too perfect for the 
purpose and thus a partial waste of resources. 
• Reduction means lowering both benefits and 
costs with the risk of inappropriateness for the 
purpose intended and therefore a partial waste 
of resources. 
• Deterioration would be a lower ratio of benefits 
to costs with the risk of the waste of resources 
engaged (time, money, labour force). This 
should be avoided, of course. 
All of these need a point of reference, of course. 
benefits  
Optimisation 
aimed at! 
Extension 
too perfect?  
Fig. 4 Fields 
for “optimising” 
projects with 
the point of 
reference in 
the centre. 
costs 
Reduction 
still usable? 
Deterioration 
waste? 
Defining the right Ratio of benefits/costs 
To define the best ratio of benefits/costs at the 
beginning of a project may not always be easy: 
• The risk of failure rises with the level of 
innovation, e.g. the decision for a highly armed 
warship with cannons on two decks may look 
like an extension (close to optimisation) 
compared to a ship with cannons on one deck 
only, but it can lead to deterioration as well. 
• The Ryan NYP (New York to Paris) was based 
on the Ryan M-2 mail plane, the main difference 
being the 4’000-mile range for the purpose of a 
one-time-success. To achieve this, the design 
included both extensions close to optimisation 
(larger wings and fuel tanks) and optimisation 
close to reduction (only one engine, no front 
view, no fuel gauges, no radio unit to save 
weight). Note: These optimisations would have 
to be judged as a reduction in serial production. 
On the other hand, a design with three engines 
would be an extension or deterioration (e.g.) 
  Definition, Complexity and Optimisation of Projects  Rolf Steinegger Dipl. Bau.-Ing ETH SIA SVI EMBE 
 Version 1.0 from December 10th 2019 Page 5 of 5	Zürcher Fachhochschule 
From a systems engineering point of view, the 
knowledge about a system is small in the beginning, 
when only an idea may be existing. It is vast and 
well documented at the end of the process of 
defining, designing, construction, assembling, 
testing, maybe redesigning and using the system. 
Thus, it can be tricky to get it right from the be 
beginning with all the major decisions needed to 
define a project and the system related to it. 
Adjusting the Ratio of benefits/costs 
The ratio of benefits to costs often is questioned 
during the phase of execution of a project: 
• A poorer performance than planned inevitably 
leads to higher costs. The same is true for 
unexpected technical challenges. A reduction 
may then be the only solution to not exceed 
budget contraints.  
Example: Large infrastructure programs (a series 
of projects related to each other) like Bahn2000 
and NEAT both had some elements (projects) 
omitted to meet the budget goals and to give 
confidence to the sovereign, who had voted for 
them. On the other hand, such programs may 
also be carried out completely despite the rise of 
cost during execution (e.g. Stuttgart21).  
• Change requests from the costumers’ side 
maybe due to new ideas, e.g. if the decision 
makers change. This may lead in any direction. 
From the king’s view, putting more cannons on 
the upper deck was an extension (close to 
optimisation) while from the experts view this 
must have been a deterioration from the 
moment the idea came up. 
• Change requests from the contractors’ side may 
occur as a result of poor specifications in the 
contract. The contractor may then try to raise 
the price by arguing, that the wanted quality was 
not clearly described in the call for tender or 
similar. This usually results in a hybrid extension 
/ deterioration (higher costs to reach the benefit 
initially intended). 
External factors have to be taken into account: 
• Modifications of regulations (environmental, 
safety a.o.) usually lead to extension.  
The NEAT program in 2013 showed higher 
costs compared to the definition in 1999 of  
+ 22 % (!) due to aggravated safety regulation; 
+ 5 % due to improvements for the environment 
(renaturation a.o.) and the local population (noise 
protection a.o.). 
There must obviously be an optimum ratio 
cost/benefit for safety measures [3] and some 
experts question the benefit of the ongoing 
increase of safety standards. Thus, there seems 
to be is a risk of deterioration in case of new 
regulations. 
• The economic situation may lead to higher or 
lower prices on the market. In this case, the 
estimations for the costs of certain services 
during the phases of definition and planning 
simply wasn’t precise (Neat: + 13 %).  
• Some boundary conditions may turn out to be 
other than expected like weather, geology etc. 
(Neat: + 7 %). 
For the two last points, this can be seen as a special 
kind of ”deterioration” or ”optimisation”. 
In all these cases, the rise of projected costs did 
take place during the design of the system and not 
during the planning of the project.  
Note the difference between:   
• planning a project, i.e. schedule and allocation 
of costs and resources (step 2 of the generic 
process for projects); 
• designing a system, i.e. carrying out projection 
work like drawing design plans a.o. (step 3 of the 
generic process for projects).  
In German, both planning and designing are often 
termed as ”planning”. This can be misleading. 
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